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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION,

:

a Utah corporation,

Case No. 940483-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
:
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N. A. ,
Defendant and Appellant.

Priority No. 15

:

RENAISSANCE EXCHANGE, INC. and :
DON NEWSOM,
Third-Party Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
STATEMENT QF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in this Court
pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(k) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1)

Whether the trial court erred in finding that

America First Credit Union's "Notice of Assignment," under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-9-318(3), reasonably notified First Security Bank
of Utah that payment of an account was to be made to First
Security.
2)

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to

grant First Security Bank of Utah a credit for proceeds
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deposited into Renaissance Exchange, Inc. ' s account with America
First.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

The proper standard of review to be applied to

the trial court' s legal determination that America First Credit
Union's ("America First") notice was adequate is that of
correctness,1 with a broad measure of discretion given to the
trial court' s determination that the notice of assignment
reasonably notified First Security Bank of Utah ("First
Security") that payment was to be made to America First.
State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994).

See

First Security's

recommendation that this court conduct a de novo review of the
first issue is misguided.2

The Utah Supreme Court in Pena

rejected de novo review where resolution to the legal question
is highly fact-dependent, giving the trial judge considerable
freedom in applying a legal principal to the facts.
937-38.

Id. at

The amount of discretion or the size of the "pasture"3

Whether a proper or adequate notice is given is typically
a question of law. New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v. State. 144
Ariz. 113, 696 P. 2d 203, 211 (Ct. App. 1984).
2

For support, First Security cites Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. Salt Lake County. 799 P. 2d 1156 (Utah 1990), which sets forth
the standard of review to an appeal from a summary judgment.
Id. at 1158-59.
3

The Supreme Court in Pena borrows Professor Maurice
Rosenberg' s metaphor of a pasture in describing the degrees of
discretion accorded a trial court' s application of legal
propositions to facts. State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d 932, 937-38
(Utah 1994).
910X7844.1
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I.

Utah Code Ann. S 7QA-9-106t
"Account" means any right to payment for
goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which 1 B not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper, whether or
not it has been earned by performance.
"General intangibles" means any personal
property (including things in action)
other than goods, accounts, chattel
paper, documents, instruments, and
money. All rights to payment earned or
unearned under a charter or other
contract involving the use or hire of a
vessel and all rights incident to the
charter or contract are accounts.

XX.

Utah Code Ann. S 70A-9-203(U:
(1) Subject to the provisions of
Section 70A-4-208 on the security
interest of a collecting bank. Section
70A-8-321 on security interests in
securities, and Section 70A-9-113 on a
security interest arising under the
chapter on sales, a security interest is
not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties with respect to the
collateral and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the
possession of the secured party
pursuant to agreement, or the
debtor has signed a security
agreement which contains a
description of the collateral and
in addition, when the security
interest covers crops growing when
the security interest covers crops
growing or to be grown or timber to
be cut, a description of the land
concerned;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in
the collateral.

III. Utah Code Ann. 5 70A-9-3i8(3):
(3) The account debtor is
authorized to pay the assignor until the
account debtor receives notification
that the amount due or to become due has
been assigned and that payment is to be
made to the assignee. A notification
which does not reasonably identify the
rights assignee is ineffective. If
requested by tne account debtor, the
assignee must seasonably furnish
reasonable proof that the assignment has
been made and unless he does so the
account debtor may pay the assignor.

expands where the facts applied to the legal rule or standard
are varying or complex and where the trial judge has observed
"facts," such as a witnesses demeanor, that cannot be adequately
reflected in the record.

IsL at 938-39.

The parties agree that the adequacy of the notice
under section 70A-9-318(3) depends upon whether the notice was
reasonable. 4

First Security does not dispute the trial court' s

legal conclusion that "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the
section 9-318(3) notice requirements.

The trial court

specifically stated:
With respect to the second notice
requirement, under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9318(3), there is no particular language
required in directing payment to the
assignee. The appropriate test is whether
the notice was reasonable under the
particular facts in the case. Moab Nat'1
Bank v. Kevstone-Wallace Resources, 30 Utah
2d 330, 517 P. 2d 1020 (1973).
(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 14, 11 13,
attached hereto as Addendum No. 1) (emphasis added).

The

parties, the trial court, and the authorities are in concert:
whether "reasonable notice" was given is the relevant query in
determining whether there was adequate notice under section 9318(3).

4

First Security frames the first issue as to whether "the
trial court err[ed] in concluding that the Credit Union' s
'Notice of Assignment' reasonably notified First
Security . . . ." (See Appellant's Brief, p. 1) (emphasis
added).
910X7844.1
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As shown in the Argument of this brief, the issue of
whether reasonable notice was given is highly fact-dependent.
£££,

e. a. , Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of Pres. of Church

Of Jegyg Chrigt pf Lflttsr-flgty gfrintB, 534 P. 2d 887 (Utah 1975);
Moab Nat'1 Bank v. Kevstone-Wallace Resources. 30 Utah 2d 330,
517 P. 2d 1020 (1973).

Courts uniformly hold that the

reasonableness of the notice under section 9-318(3) is a factual
question and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

See,

e. g. , Municipal Trust and Sav. Bank v. Grant Park Community
Dist. Number 6, 171 111. App. 289, 121 111. Dec. 449, 525 N. E.
2d 235 (1988) (what is reasonable notice under section 9-318(3)
must be determined by the particular facts of each case); Hall
Bros. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Mercantile Nat'1 Bank of Indiana. No.
45A05-9401-CV-14, 1994 WL 615303, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 9,
1994) (section 9-318(3) does not prescribe any "magic words;"
the sufficiency of a notice depends upon the facts of each
case).

Given the significance of and the variance of fact

patterns in each case, courts understandably are loath to
require "magic words" or particular language for notices under
section 9-318(3).
Underscoring the need in this case to accord the trial
court discretion is that the trial court observed the demeanor
of the witnesses, judged their credibility, and, on the basis of
its observations, made specific factual determinations relevant
to notice.
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The difference in the standards of review advocated by
the parties mirrors the fundamental difference between the
parties in their evidentiary approach to this case on both the
trial and appeal levels.

First Security' s approach is

legalistic, hypertechnical and sterile; it requests the court to
focus on the exact language the bank insists is required to
effectuate reasonable notice in every assignment, regardless of
the circumstances.

America First' s approach is factual,

realistic and policy-oriented; it requests the courts to focus
on the particular facts and circumstances in each case.
II.

First Security correctly states the standard of

review for the second issue: a correction of error standard for
assessing the proper theory for measuring damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

America First sued First Security after First Security
wrongfully paid out the proceeds of a certified deposit account
to Renaissance Exchange, Inc. ("Renaissance"), a Georgia
Corporation doing business in Weber County, Utah.

Renaissance

had assigned the account to America First as collateral security
for a loan, and America First notified First Security in writing
of the assignment.

First Security recognized the assignment and

acknowledged that payment was to be made to America First, not
Renaissance.

First Security issued a savings certificate to

America First that was payable upon presentation.

910X7844.1
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First

Security later paid the proceeds to Renaissance upon demand.
Renaissance then defaulted on its loan with America FirstAmerica First presented its savings certificate to First
Security and demanded payment of the account proceeds, but First
Security refused to make payment as promised. 5
II.

Course of Proceedings

America First brought an action against First Security
to enforce its rights in the proceeds.

First Security filed a

third-party claim against Renaissance and Don Newsom, president
and sole shareholder of Renaissance, for the entire amount
sought from First Security by America First.

In a separate

action, America First sued both Newsom and Renaissance for the
deficiency on the loan.

The two actions, including First

Security' s third-party action, were consolidated.
The consolidated action was tried in a bench trial on
November 8-9 and December 10, 1993.

The trial court took the

case under advisement, and on February 24, 1994, the trial court
entered a judgment for America First against First Security for
the full amount of the account proceeds ($99,999.00); judgment
for America First against Don Newsom and Renaissance for the
5

A principal issue addressed at trial that is not at issue
in this appeal was whether America First had an enforceable
security interest in the savings certificate. The trial court
determined that the future advances clause contained in the
security agreement between America First and First Security is
enforceable, the parties actually intending the certificate of
deposit to secure the later loan, thus giving the credit union
an enforceable security interest in the security certificate.
910X7844.1
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full amount of the loan deficiency ($551,529.11, less the amount
paid by First Security to America First in accordance with the
judgment); and judgment for First Security against Don Newsom
and Renaissance for the account proceeds ($99,999.00).

The

trial court later entered its findings of fact and conclusions
of law.

First Security now appeals the judgment for America

First against First Security.
III.

Statement of Facts

Between April of 1988 and May of 1990, America First,
Renaissance and Don R. Newsom entered into three loan
transactions.

(Record at 337. )

Renaissance contracted with the

United States Government to operate food facilities in thirteen
states.6

(R. at 336, 737. )

The purpose of each of the three

loans was essentially the same for each loan: to establish or
renew a line of credit to provide Renaissance with working
capital to purchase government food-service contracts and to pay
off its debts with other financial institutions, including the
Bank of Utah and Valley Bank.

(R. at 337-40; 407. )

As part of

the first loan transaction, Renaissance executed a commercial
security agreement in favor of America First, granting the
credit union a security interest in a certificate of deposit,

6

At one point, Renaissance employed nearly eight hundred
employees. Don R. Newsom was the president and sole shareholder
of Renaissance. Renaissance is no longer doing business. (R.
at 336; 735-36. )
910X7844. 1
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No.

984993, held at First Security, in the amount of $99, 999, 00,

(R. at 338. )
America First then took actual possession of the
certificate of deposit.

The certificate of deposit stated on

its face that it is "payable at the issuing office to the
registered owner(s) upon presentation to surrender the
certificate properly endorsed. . . . "

America First officials

believed that First Security would pay the proceeds from the
certificate of deposit only upon presentation, as stated on the
face of the certificate.

(R. at 340; 437-38; 446-47. )

Indeed,

it was First Security' s policy that it would pay the proceeds
from the certificate of deposit only upon presentation, as
stated upon the certificate.

(R. at 720-21.)

First Security

later changed its internal policy so that the registered owner
of a certificate of deposit, despite what the plain language on
the certificate states, needs not present and surrender the
certificate to get their money out.

First Security did not

notify America First of this change in policy.

(R. at 340, 619,

718. )
America First then notified First Security in writing
that it was holding the certificate as collateral.

Don Newsom

signed the written notice of assignment as president of
Renaissance, acknowledging that Renaissance assigned the
certificate to America First.

An officer of First Security

signed the Assignment to confirm the balance of the certificate

910X7844.1
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and to promise that America First' s security interest would be
in effect until First Security received written notice from
America First that the security interest was released.

The

written notice of assignment stated as follows:
ASSIGNMENT QF $AVIN(?$ CERTIFICATE
We are holding as collateral on a Line of
Credit Savings Certificate No. 984993 in the
Amount of $99,999.00, in the name of
Renaissance Exchange. Renaissance Exchange,
Inc. is willing to pledge this certificate
as collateral on their loan with America
First Credit Union.
Renaissance Exchange, Inc.
By:

fDon R. Newsom. Pres.
Title

America First Credit Union is holding the
original certificate as collateral. We
would appreciate your acknowledgement of the
Assignment, also confirming the balance of
$99,999.00. This Assignment will be in
effect until vou have received written
notice of our release of the Assignment.
Please acknowledge the Assignment and the
balance by signing below. One copy should
be retained in your files.
First Security Bank of Utah
By:

fDonald B. Hansen
Asst. Vice Pres.

(emphasis added).

Title

(R. at 341-42; Addendum "1".)

First Security then recognized the assignment and the
notice that payment should be made to America First, not
Renaissance, and flagged on its computer system the assignment
for the certificate of deposit. The information on the computer
screen was designed to alert First Security employees of the
910X7844. 1
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assignment and the credit union' s right to payment.

When the

certificate of deposit was rolled over into a new certificate,
bearing the number 985011, First Security again properly coded
into its computer system the assignment for certificate 985011.
(R. at 342; 657-61. )
After the second loan was transacted, America First
gave First Security a second written assignment identical to the
first assignment.

Because the savings certificate had been

rolled over into a subsequent certificate, a First Security Bank
official crossed out No. 984993 on the face of the assignment
and handwrote in pen, No. 985011.

Don R. Newsom again signed

the second assignment as president of Renaissance, acknowledging
that Renaissance assigned the certificate to America First.

An

officer of First Security again signed the assignment, making
the same confirmation and acknowledgements as in the first
assignment.

First Security never demanded from America First

more proof or information of either written assignment.

(R. at

342-43; addendum "2". )
When the certificate of deposit was rolled over the
third time into a new certificate, First Security inadvertently
failed to flag on its computer system the assignment to America
First, which would have alerted bank employees of the assignment
and of the credit union' s right to payment.

First Security did

not inform or notify America First that it removed the computer
block flagging the assignment, nor did the bank inform or notify

910X7844 1
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America First that when it rolled the certificate over the third
time that it had replaced the certificate with a day-time
deposit receipt.

(R. at 343; 661-64. )

On two different occasions, once when the savings
certificate matured in September of 1989 and when the day-time
deposit matured later in March of 1990, Renaissance withdrew
from the account the interest that had accrued, but left the
principal of $99, 999. 00.

(R. at 344. )

In May of 1990, Newsom represented to First Security
that America First had released its interest in the savings
certificate and made a demand for the certificate proceeds.
First Security then tendered the proceeds of the savings
certificate to Renaissance and issued a check to Renaissance for
$100,836.62, the total principal and interest in the account.
Renaissance then deposited the proceeds from the savings
certificate into their account with America First.

(R. at 344. )

At the time of the deposit of the $100,836.62 into
Renaissance' s account, America First had five contracts assigned
to it.

Renaissance' s account had additional funds, ranging from

$20,000.00 to $40,000.00 flowing through its account from these
contracts on a weekly basis.

(R. at 448-49. )

Seven months after First Security tendered to
Renaissance the proceeds from the savings certificate,
Renaissance defaulted on its payments to America First.

America

First made a demand on First Security to pay the credit union

910X7844.1
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the proceeds of the certificate and offered to tender the
certificate.

First Security refused to tender the proceeds of

the certificate and told the credit union that it had paid the
proceeds to Renaissance.

(R. at 344-45; 436-37. )

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First Security claims that the notice of assignment
under section 70A-9-318(3) of the Utah Code did not demand
payment to America First.

First Security does not, however,

dispute that the other notice requirements of section 70A-9318(3) were satisfied.
The law is clear that notice that payment is to be
made to the assignee (America First) is adequate if the notice
is reasonable under the particular facts and circumstances.

No

magic words or particular language is required for effective
notice.

What constitutes reasonable notice depends upon the

facts and circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

Also highly

relevant are the business expectations of America First and
First Security.
The Official Comment to the Uniform Code expressly
state that the purpose of requiring the notice to demand payment
to the assignee is to accommodate ordinary business practices in
indirect collection situations.

In an indirect collection

situation, it is important that notice that payment is directed
to the assignee be explicit.

The stringency of this notice

requirement loses steam, however, when there is not an indirect

910X7844 1
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collection situation.

To hold otherwise is to turn a deaf ear

to the policies underlying section 70A-9-318(3).
In this case, America First' s notice of assignment
reasonably demanded payment under the particular facts and
circumstances.

First Security does not dispute any of the trial

court' s factual findings.

Instead, First Security is asking

this Court to determine that the payment notice was insufficient
based on the notice alone.
This case does not involve an indirect collection
situation.

Treating this case as an indirect collection

situation makes no sense and would not further the policies and
purposes underlying section 70A-9-318(3).

The trial court found

that First Security had actual knowledge that payment was to be
directed to America First.
thereof.

Actual knowledge of a fact notice

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(25)(b) (1990).
The particular facts and circumstances in this case

show that the notice was reasonable.

First Security

acknowledged and promised to comply with America First' s
request.

First Security never demanded more proof of the

assignment.

The notice was not sent independent by America

First, and it was co-signed by Don Newsom of Renaissance.

The

reasonableness of the notice is further evidenced by the fact
that America First had in its possession a savings certificate
that indicated that the moneys in the certificate would not be
released unless upon proper presentation.

910\7844. 1
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Under the plain language of section 70A-9-318(3), it
is immaterial that America First' s rights to the collateral
ripen only upon default of Renaissance,

Subsection (3)

expressly applies to situations where the account debtor
receives notification that the amount due or to become due has
been assigned.
Finally, the trial court did not err in refusing to
credit First Security for proceeds deposited into Renaissance' s
account with America First.

The $19,096.03 directly benefitted

Valley Bank, not America First.

It is pure speculation by First

Security that America First benefitted from the deposit and is
not an issue worthy of remanding for further consideration.
ARGUMENT
I.
First Security does not dispute

that it receive notice that the
account had been assigned and that
the notice reasonably identified
the rights that had been assigned.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318 governs the rights of
parties in Utah where an assignment of an account or some
intangible is made.

Section 70A-9-318(3) resolves certain

predictable problems that arise upon assignment between
"assignor," "assignee," and "account debtor," with the term
"account debtor" defined to mean "the person who is obligated on
an account, chattel paper or general intangible. "
Ann. § 70A-9-105(l)(a) (1990).

910X7844.1
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Utah Code

In this case, America First is

14

the assignee, Renaissance is the assignor, and First Security
Bank is the account debtor.
Section 70A-9-318(3) authorizes the account debtor
(First Security) to pay the assignor (Renaissance) until the
account debtor (First Security) receives notice that (1) the
amount due or to become due has been assigned, (2) demand that
the account debtor make payment to the assignee, and (3)
reasonably identify the rights that have been assigned.
Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990).

Utah

Subsection (3) states in full:

The account debtor [First Security Bank]
is authorized to pay the assignor
[Renaissance] until the account debtor
receives notification of the amount due or
to become due has been assigned and that
payment is to be made to the assignee
[credit union]. Notification which does not
reasonably identify the rights assigned is
ineffective. If requested by the account
debtor, the assignee must furnish reasonable
proof that the assignment has been made and
unless he does so the account debtor may pay
the assignor.

The trial court found that the notice requirements
were satisfied by the notice of assignment in this case.

On

appeal, First Security does not dispute that it received notice
that the account had been assigned.

Nor does First Security

dispute that the notice reasonably identifies the rights that
have been assigned First.

Security disputes only the trial

court' s finding that the notice reasonably demanded payment to
America First.

910X7844.1
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II.

Notice that payment is to be made
to the assignee is adequate if
the notice is reasonable under
the particular facts and circumstances.
No magic words or language are required for effective
notice under section 70A-9-318(3).

Instead, the adequacy of the

notice hinges upon the reasonableness of the notice.

What is

reasonable depends upon the particular facts and circumstances
of each case, including the reasonable business expectations of
the parties.

A.
Aflequate notice under section 7QA-9318(3) does not require any particular
language.
First Security would have this court to decide the
sufficiency of what constitutes adequate notice under section
70A-9-318(3) in a vacuum, disregarding the particular facts and
the underlying policies of the statute.

The bottom line for

First Security is that the assignment is unenforceable because
the magic word "payment" does not appear on the assignment.
First Security is flatly wrong.

The Uniform Commercial Code

does not require any particular language or "magic words" to be
used in directing payment to the assignee.

See Hall Bros.

Constr. Co. . Inc. v. Mercantile Nat' 1 Bank of Indiana. No,
45A05-9401-CV-14, 1994 WL 615303, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 9,
1994) ("Section 9-318(3) does not prescribe any 'magic words'
for a notice of assignment."); First Nat' 1 Bank of Rio Arriba v.
910X7844.1
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Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. , 91 N. M. 126, 571 P. 2d 118-119
(1977) ("The code does not require any particular language to be
used in directing payment to the assignee."); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Albany Water Bd. , 187 AD 894, 590 N. Y. S. 2d
312,

(1992) ("No particular form of notice is required; rather,

it is sufficient if the information known to the debtor either
apprises the debtor of the assignment or serves to put the
debtor on inquiry."); Gateway Nat' 1 Bank of Chicago v. Saxe, 40
A. D. 653, 336 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (1972) (no particular form of notice
is required by section 9-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
B.
The adequacy of notice under section
70A-9-318m turns on whether the notice is
reasonable under the particular facts and

circumstances of each case.
Section 70A-9-318(3) requires only that the notice
reasonably demand payment to the assignee.

Municipal Trust and

Sav. Bank v. Grant Park Community Dist. Number 6. 171 111. App.
289,

121 111. Dec. 449, 525 N. E. 2d 235, 258 (1988).

What is

"reasonable" is determined by the particular facts on a case-bycase basis.

Id.

In Municipal Trust and Sav. Bank, an

assignee's letter of notice under section 9-318(3) reasonably
notified the account debtor that the assignee had acquired the
assignor7 s rights by assignment and reasonably demanded payment
where, despite the potential insufficiency of the notice on its
face, the account debtor acknowledged and promised to comply
with the assignee' s request instead of demanding further proof

910X7844.1
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of the assignment.

IiL at 258.

The court in Municipal Trust

and Savs. Bank specifically states:
Under the facts as alleged in this
case, we believe that plaintiff s letter
reasonably notified defendant that plaintiff
had a right to assignment and reasonably
demanded payment. We make no judgment as to
the sufficiency of the notice standing
alone, but base our decision on the fact
that defendant chose to acknowledge and
promise to comply with plaintiff s request
instead of demanding more proof of the
assignment. In this light, the language by
plaintiff . . . meets the reasonableness
test; especially when considering the notice
was not sent independently by plaintiff, but
was also co-signed by the assignor.
Similarly, we have been provided no
authority which holds that notices sent
under section 9-318(3) require "magic words"
to be effective. In fact, the only
requirement is that the notice reasonably
identify the rights of the assignee and
reasonably demands payment to the assignee.
What is "reasonable" must be determined by
the particular facts of each case.
Id. (emphasis added).

See also Hall Bros. Constr. Co. . Inc. .

No. 45A05-9401-CV-14, 1994 WL 615303, at *5 ("Whether a notice
is sufficient depends upon the facts of each case.").
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the adequacy of a
notice of assignment in two cases:

Bank of Salt Lake v.

Corporation pf Prgg, pf the ghyrgh pf Jegyg Chrigt Qf Lgrtter-flgiy
Saints, 534 P. 2d 887 (Utah 1975) and Moab Nat' 1 Bank v.
Keystone-Wallace Resources, 30 Utah 2d 330, 517 P. 2d 1020
(1973).

In both cases, the touchstone of adequate notice is

whether the notice was reasonable under the specific facts and
circumstances.
910X7844.1
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In Bank of Salt Lake, the Utah Supreme Court found
that notice to a clerical employee could not reasonably be
construed as notice to the church.

Where the bank had no direct

dealings with the church, and had relied completely on what the
assignor said and did, it had not taken "such steps as could be
reasonably required to inform the Church of these assignments. "
Bank of Salt Lake. 534 P. 2d at 891.
In Moab Nat' 1 Bank, the Utah Supreme Court sustained
the trial court' s finding that Keystone-Wallace Resources
received reasonable notice of the assignment and was under a
duty to pay over to the plaintiff the amount due to the
assignor. 7

Moab Nat; 1 Bank. 517 P. 2d at 1022-23.

First

Security attempts to distinguish Moab Nat' 1 Bank from this case
by pointing out "that the account creditor [sic] was notified by
telephone that $4,000.00 was to be paid to the assignee. "
(First Security' s Brief, p. 14. ) Assuming this is a valid
factual distinction, it is irrelevant to this argument.

Moab

Nat' 1 Bank, as well as other cases cited by both parties, were
decided under particular facts and circumstances, some of which
may or may not be applicable to this case.

The salient point in

Moab Nat' 1 Bank is, however, that the test of whether America
First' s notice was reasonable is to be determined under the
specific circumstances and facts unique to this case.
7

Although the court does not specifically refer to section
70A-9-318(3), the statutory notice requirement is incorporated
into the court' s analysis.
910X7844. 1
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In both Bank of Salt Lake and Moab Nat' 1 Bank, the
Utah Supreme Court found guidance in the additional U. C. C.
provisions of section 70A-1-201(25)-(26) of the Utah Code.

See

Bank of Salt Lake, 534 P. 2d at 889-90 ("The provisions of
[section 70A-1-201(25)-(26)] determine the result of this
appeal."); Moab Nat' 1 Bank. 517 P. 2d at 1022-23 (affirms the
trial court's reliance on section 70A-1-201(25)-(26) in finding
the assignment enforceable).
Section 70A-1-201(25) defines when a person has
"notice" of a fact.

The determination is fact-driven.

The

provision specifically states:
(a)

A person has "notice" of a fact when:
(i)
he has actual knowledge of it; or
(ii) he has received a notice or
notification of it; or
(iii) from all the facts and
circumstances known to him at the time
in question he has reason to know that
it exists.

(b) A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of
a fact when he has actual knowledge of it.
(c) "Discover" or learn" or a word or
phrase of similar import refers to knowledge
rather than to reason to know.
(d) The time and circumstances under which
a notice or notification may cease to be
effective are not determined by this title.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(25) (1990).
Section 70A-1-201(26) defines when a person gives
notice.

910X7844.1
11/15/94

The determination depends upon the reasonable

20

expectations of the parties in the ordinary course.

The

provision states:
(a) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice
or notification to another by taking such
St3P5 AS mjiyft<?refrgpn?il?ly regytirefl to
inform the other in ordinary course whether
or not such other actually comes to know of
it.
(b) A person "receives" a notice or
notification when:
(i) it comes to his attention; or
(ii) it is duly delivered at the place
of business through which the contract was
made or at any other place held out by him
as the place for receipt of such
communi cati ons.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26) (1990) (emphasis added).
The decision of what is "reasonable" is not left to
the arbitrary decision of First Security.

The U. C.C. commentary

states:
What is "reasonable" is not left to the
arbitrary decision of the account debtor; if
there is doubt as to the adequacy either of
a notification or of proof submitted after
request, the account debtor may not be safe
in disregarding it unless he has notified
the assignee with commercial promptness as
to the respects in which identification or
proof is considered defective.
U. C. C. § 9-318, Official Comment 5 (1990).
The notice sent by America First to First Security did
not require magic words to be effective.

The only requirement

was that the notice reasonably demand payment to America First.
What is reasonable in this case, as in all cases, turns on the

910\7844.1
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specific facts and circumstances.

Also relevant to the query of

what constitutes reasonable notice are the business expectations
of America First and First Security.
C.
The purpose of requiring the notice to
demand payment to the assignee is to
accommodate ordinary business practices in

indirect-collection situations.
The express goal of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code "is to provide a simple and unified structure
within which the immense variety of present-day secured
financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with
greater certainty."
(1990).

See U. C. C. § 9-101, Official Comment

This broad goal is the very essence of the Official

Comment to section 9-318(3)/ which makes clear that the basic
purpose of the second notice requirement is to accommodate
ordinary business expectations of the account debtor and the
seller-assignor in "indirect collection" situations.

The

Official Comment states:
Subsection (3) clarifies the right of
an account debtor to make payment to his
seller-assignor in an "indirect collection"
situation (comment to § 9-308). So long as
the assignee permits the assignor to collect
claims or leaves him in possession of
chattel paper which does not indicate the
payment is to be made at some place other
than the assignor' s place of business, the
account debtor may pay the assignor even
though he may know the assignment. In such
a situation, an assignee who wants to take
over collections must notify the account
debtor to make further payments to him.
U. C. C. § 9-318, Official Comment 3 (1990) (emphasis added).
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The comments to U. C. C. § 9-308 explain what is meant
by an "indirect-collection arrangement,"
Arrangements where the chattel paper is
delivered to the secured party who then
makes collections, as well as arrangements
where the debtor, whether or not he is left
in possession of the paper, makes the
collections, are both widely used, as are
known respectively as notification (or
"direct collection") and non-notification
(or "indirect collection") arrangements. In
the automobile field, for example, when a
car is sold to a consumer buyer under an
installment purchase agreement and the
resultant chattel paper is assigned, the
assignee usually takes possession, the
obligor is notified of the assignment and is
directed to make payments to the assignee.
In the furniture field, for example on the
other hand, the chattel paper may be left in
the dealer' s hands or delivered to the
assignee; in either case the obligor may not
be notified, and payments are made to the
dealer-assignor who receives them under a
duty to remit to his assignee. The
widespread use of both methods of dealing
with chattel paper is recognized by the
provisions of this Article, which permit
perfection of a chattel paper security
interest either by filing or by taking
possession.
U. C. C. § 9-318, Official Comment 1 (1990).
Subsection (3) to section 9-318 makes it possible
therefore in indirect collection situations for the assignor and
the assignee to agree that the assignor may continue to collect
its accounts, that the assignee may directly collect the
accounts, or that the assignee may, at any time it desires, take
over collection of the accounts.

In an indirect-collection

situation it is imperative that the notice that payment is

910X7844.1
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directed to the assignee must be explicit.

Otherwise, the

account debtor is at risk and will not know if the assignor
intends to continue to collect the accounts.

The stringency of

the second notice requirement loses steam, however, when there
is not an indirect collection situation.

To hold otherwise is

to turn a deaf ear to the policies underlying section 70A-9318(3).
First Security states that America First "argued
before the trial court that notice was sufficient because this
is not an ' indirect collection7
p. 17. )

case. "

(First Security' s Brief,

Actually, America First argued and still argues that

notice was sufficient because it was reasonable.

Relevant to

whether the notice was reasonable, however, is the fact that
this case does not involve an indirect collection situation.
First Security claims that the Official Comment to
section 9-318(3) is not supported by case authority.
Security7 s claim is erroneous.

First

Leading case authority relies

heavily on the Official Comment to subsection (3) in determining
whether notice is reasonable.

See e. a. , Warrington v. Dawson.

798 F. 2d 1533, 1536 (5th Cir. 1986); Great S. Nat7 1 Bank v.
McCullouah Envtl. Servs. , Inc. , 595 So. 2d 1282, 1287-88 (Miss.
1992); First Fidelity Bank v. Matthews. 692 P. 2d 1255, 1260
(Mont. 1984);

First Nat71 Bank of Rio Arriba v. Mountain

States Tel. & Tel. Co. , 91 N. M. 126, 571 P. 2d 118, 120 (1977).
In First Nat71 Bank of Rio Arriba, a case widely followed for
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its analysis in determining the notice requirements in § 9318(3), the New Mexico Supreme Court relies heavily on the
Official Comment to § 9-318(3).

The New Mexico Supreme Court

held that language in an assignment that was far less explicit
and restrictive than the language in the assignment in this case
gave sufficient notice that payment was to be to the assignee.
The New Mexico Supreme Court' s liberal reading of the assignment
language with respect to Article 9 notice requirements was
premised on the limiting policy of section 9-318(3) to
accommodate indirect-collection situations.

The New Mexico

Supreme Court explains:
The code does not require any particular
language to be used in directing payment to
the assignee. One purpose for the provision
requiring notice that "payment is to be made
to the assignee" is to allow for commercial
situations where accounts are used as
collateral to secure a loan repayment. In
such cases, the borrower often retains the
right to collect the accounts, and may
assign these rights of collection only upon
default by the borrower. Such a transaction
is referred to as an "indirect collection."
4 R Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code,
supra. Comment 3 to Section 9-318, and
Comment 1 to Section 9-308. Subjected to
such an assignment and indirect collection
situation, the account debtor could not be
expected to pay the assignee until he had
been instructed to do so.
Id. at 120.

First Security attempts to limit Rio Arriba by

suggesting that the "indirect collection situation" is "only one
purpose for the requirement that the account debtor be directed
to pay. "

910X7844.1
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First Security

is playing with semantics in its attempt to downplay the
straight-forward policy objective articulated in the Official
Comment,

The Comment itself does not refer to any other purpose

of subsection (3). Moreover America First is not suggesting
that the notice provisions of subsection (3) are limited to
indirect collection situations.

Instead/ America First simply

asserts that a critical consideration in determining whether
notice is reasonable is whether the facts involve an indirect
collection situation.
First Security claims that the case Union Inv. Inc. v.
Midland-Guardian Co. . 30 Ohio App. 3d 59, 506 N. E. 2d 271 (1986)
completely refutes the purpose of the notice requirement as
articulated in the Official Comment to section 9-318(3).
Ohio Court of Appeals makes no such sweeping holding.

The

First

Security draws a broad insupportable conclusion based upon a
unique factual situation.

The stated facts in Union Inv. are

sparse, but apparently the case did not involve an indirect
collection situation.

The Ohio Court of Appeals determined,

however, that the assignment language was confusing and
inadequate because the language "merely 'authorized' payment to
Union. fl

Id. at 275. 8

from Union Inv.

This case is clearly distinguishable

America First' s assignment does not merely

8

First Security places great stock in Union Inv. The Ohio
Court of Appeals decision, however, is not by any stretch a
leading case. Not one single case has even cited Union
Investment for its analysis of section 9-318(3).
910X7844.1
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"authorize" payment.

The facts show that the First Security

understood fully well that payment was directed to the credit
union upon the default of Renaissance.

A demand subject to a

contingency is completely different from a mere authorization of
payment.
The other decisions cited by First Security are not
controlling either.

For instance, in an indirect-collection

situation in First Trust & Savs. Bank of Glenview v. Skokie
Fed'1 Savs. & Loan Ass'n. 126 111. App. 3d, 42, 81 111. Dec.
246,

466 N. E. 2d 1048 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1984), the assignment,

although acknowledged by the account debtor, merely authorized
the account debtor to make payments to the assignee.

Moreover,

the assignee acquiesced for roughly 2 1/2 years before taking
action to enforce its rights under the assignment.

The court

concluded that the acquiescence on the part of the assignee and
the mere "authorization" in the notice of assignment given to
the account debtor amounted to an insufficient demand for
payment.

Id. at 1050.
Given the variance of facts and circumstances that

range from case to case, it is not surprising that the court in
Municipal Trust and Sav. Bank stresses the fact-intensive nature
of the notice requirement in section 9-318(3).
and Sav. Bank, 525 N. E. 2d at 258.

Municipal Trust

What constitutes reasonable

notice must be determined from the notice alone, but in the
context of the particular facts and circumstances.

910X7844.1
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Id.

ILL
America First's assignment reasonably
demanded payment under the particular facts and
circumstances in this case.
First Security does not dispute any of the trial
court' s factual findings.

The trial court made specific factual

findings and concluded that America First reasonably notified
First Security that payment was to be made to America First.
(Record at 349.)

First Security simply argues that the notice

did not contain the magic word of "payment" or language
particular enough to satisfy the notice requirements under
section 70A-9-318(3).

First Security makes no effort to place

the notice in a factual context.

Instead, First Security

requests that this Court determine whether the notice was
reasonable from the notice alone.
The facts in this case clearly support the trial
court' s finding that the notice reasonably demands payment to
America First.

These facts consider the parties' reasonable

business expectations and the particular acts and statements of
the parties.

The facts are sufficient, and this Court is

compelled under Pena to accord the trial court broad discretion
in its applying the facts to the notice requirements of section
70A-9-318(3).
A.

This case does not involve an indirect

collection situation.
This case is not an indirect collection or even a
direct collection situation.
910X7844.1
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There are no claims to collect.
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The account in this case involves a savings account, not an
arrangement that involves the collection of claims. 9

Treating

the arrangement in this case as an indirect collection situation
makes no sense.

Bootstrapping to the arrangement in this case

the rule regarding indirect collections does nothing to further
the policies and purposes underlying section 70A-9-318(3).

B.

First Security had actual knowledge

that payment was to be directed to America

Zixai.
First Security expressly acknowledged that payment was
to be made to America First, not Renaissance, when it placed a
hold on the account.
America First.

The bank knew payment was to be made to

Actual knowledge of a fact is notice thereof.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(25)(b) (1990); £££ also Gateway Nat' 1
Bank of Chicago v. Saxe. 40 A. D. 653, 336 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (1972)
("Since no particular form of notice is required by the Uniform
Commercial Code and actual knowledge of a fact is notice thereof
(U. C. C. § 1-201(25), the knowledge of defendant's senior partner
is imputed to it.").

Now in the aftermath of its "oversight,"

First Security attempts to extinguish its previously-recognized
duty by insisting that the assignment did not, in effect,
contain the magic words First Security insists are required
under § 70A-9-318(3).

9

The fact that America First' s rights to the collateral
ripen only upon default of Renaissance is material only if this
case involved an indirect collection situation.
910X7844.1
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C.

The particular facts and circumstances

in this case show that the notice was
reasonable.
Although each case differs factually, Municipal Trust
and Savs. Bank poses an analogous factual setting.

Like the

defendant in Municipal Trust and Savs. Bank, First Security
acknowledged and promised to comply with America First' s
request-

First Security even went one step further and placed a

hold on the account.

Also similar to the defendant in Municipal

Trust and Savings Bank. First Security never demanded more proof
of the assignment.

The final similarity is that the notice was

not sent independently by America First; it was co-signed by Don
Newsom.

£££ Municipal Trust and Savs. Bank v. Grant Park

Community Dist. Number 6. 171 111. App. 289, 121 111. Dec. 449,
525 N. E. 2d 235, 238 (1988).

The assignment did not merely

"authorize" payment as the parties did in Union Inv.
The reasonableness of America First' s notice is
further punctuated by the fact that America First had in its
possession a savings certificate that indicated that the monies
in the certificate of deposit would not be released unless upon
proper presentation.

America First reasonably believed that

First Security would do as it represented it would do on the
savings certificate.

First Security' s action in placing a hold

on the account also underscores the reasonableness of America
First' s expectation that the savings certificate meant what it
said.
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For the first time in this case First Security now
argues that the security agreement precludes America First from
entitlement to the account proceeds until Renaissance defaulted
on the loan.

(First Security7 s brief, pp. 18-19. )

This

argument reflects the bank/ s further misunderstanding of section
70A-9-318(3).

Under the plain language of section 70A-9-318(3),

it is immaterial that America First' s rights to the collateral
ripen only upon default of Renaissance.

Subsection (3)

expressly applies to situations where the "account debtor
receives notification that the amount due or to become due has
been assigned . . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990).

Moreover, First Security' s argument actually further
evidences the reasonableness of the notice.

It would not make

sense for America First to explicitly demand payment;
Renaissance was not in default at the time and this was not an
indirect collection situation.

First Security does not dispute

that it received notice and was instructed by the notice not to
release the $99,999.00 to Renaissance unless it received from
America First a written notice of release.
In an attempt to strap America First with a
requirement that in no way reflects the reasonable business
expectations of the parties, First Security hopes to escape the
consequences of its mistake when it released the hold on the
assigned account.

Its attempt under section 70A-9-318(3) is

tantamount to forcing a square peg in a round hole.
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Fortunately, the U. C. C. will not accommodate First Security' s
endeavor.
IV.
The trial court did not err in
refusing to credit First Security

for proceeds deposited into
Renaissance' s account with America First
First Security argues that America First must be given
a credit for the alleged $19,096.03 benefit it received from the
account proceeds.

First Security derives the amount of

$19,096.03 from the difference between the total payoff of the
Valley Bank loan ($304,243.33) and the portion of the third loan
available to pay on that loan ($285,187.04).

First Security's

assumption that the $19,096.03 is a red herring; it is based
upon pure speculation and makes no sense.
The $19,096.03 directly benefitted Valley Bank, not
America First.

The only possible benefit to America First is

"the consolidation of collateral."

First Security did not

explain to the trial court, and it does not now explain to this
Court, how this supposed "consolidation of collateral" gave
America First a benefit of $19,096.03.

The evidence at trial

shows that at the time of the deposit, Renaissance had
additional funds, ranging from $20,000.00 to $40,000.00, flowing
through its account from other major contracts on a weekly
basis.
First Security attempts to force the issue by citing
to Citizens Nat' 1 Bank v. Witt, 367 F. 2d 541 (5th Cir. 1966),
910X7844 1
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the facts of which render the decision wholly inapplicable to
this case.

Citizens Nat/ 1 Bank involved an indirect collection

situation.

The subcontractor had assigned to the bank moneys

payable under a subcontract and directed the contractor to make
the checks payable to the subcontractor and the bank.

The bank

brought a claim against the contractor for payments it made to
the subcontractor alone in breach of the assignment by the
subcontractor to the bank.

The court noted that in determining

the liability of the contractor to the bank, there were defenses
available.

For example, the court held that where a check

payable to the subcontractor alone was deposited by it in the
bank, it can claim no injury because it was not named as a
payee.

Citizens Nat' 1 Bank, 367 F. 2d at 547 ("Since the

assignment was a security, Stringfellow [the contractor] will
not be liable to the bank for checks made to West [the
subcontractor] alone at such time or times, if any there were,
when West was not indebted to the bank. ")
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in holding that America
First complied with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3).

The trial

court did not err in refusing to grant First Security a credit
for proceeds deposited into Renaissance' s account with America
First.
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requests that this Court deny First Security' s appeal.
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ASSIGNMENT OF SAVINGS CEEgnFICATE
Vfe are holding as collateral on a Line of Credit Savings Certificate No
984993 in the Amount of $99f999.00f in the name of Renaissance
Exchange. Renaissance Exchange Inc. is willing to pledge this
certificate as collateral on their loan with America First Credit Union.
Renaissance Exchange, Inc.

By: ja*s/fc
~%

fas,^*^

.

f&fi^Jiy

Title

America First Credit Union is holding the original certificate as
collateral. We would appreciate your acknowledgement of the
Assignmentf also confirming the balance of $99,999.00. This Assignment
will be in affect until you have received written notice of our release
of the Assignment. Please acknowledge the Assignment and the balance
by signing belcw. One copy should be retained in your files.

/ *

ASSIGNMENT OF SAVINGS CERTIFICATE

^ w

We are holding as collateral on a Line of Credit Savings Certificate No
984993 in the Amount of $99,999.00, in the name of Renaissance
Exchange. Renaissance Exchange Inc. is willing to pledge this
certificate as collateral on their loan with America First Credit Union.

Renaissance Exchange, Inc.

Vf^^^g^^^n
th
Title
America First Credit Union is holding the original certificate as
collateral. We would appreciate your acknowledgement of the
Assignment, also confirming the balance of $99,999.00. This Assignment
will be in effect until you have received written notice of our release
of the Assignment. Please acknowledge the Assignment and the balance
by signing below. One copy should be retained in your files.
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